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ABSTRACT 
The application of Safety Integrity Level (SIL) to support risk 
management strategy on turbo machinery protection systems is 
relatively new to the process industry. Few end users and 
manufacturers fully understand the methodology used for 
determining, assessing and computing the SIL of protection 
systems on their machines.  
SIL is quickly becoming the new standard by which the industry, 
manufacturers and end users will be held to by regulators as good 
engineering practice. Specifically supporting turbomachinery, the 
latest API Standard 670, Machinery Protection Systems [R1] has 
embraced such methodology and included Appendix L, an 
informative section on Safety Integrity Level on its application.   
This tutorial attempts to explain the Basics of SIL, how it is 
applied, and what end users need to know to effectively assess their 
machinery protection systems. It provides examples for assessing 
existing systems and how to compute SIL levels for new and older 
systems. It shows common SIL ratings for turbine driven trains, 
reciprocating compressors, motor and gas turbine driven 
equipment. This tutorial will also highlight the economic 
justification and cost benefit of utilizing SIL on machinery 
protection systems.   
Not knowing or understanding SIL as it applies to machinery 
protection will not be an excuse in the future. This tutorial will 
provide a good opportunity to learn more about SIL and its 
application to turbo machinery protection.  
BACKGROUND ON RISK MANAGEMENT AND 
APPLICATION OF SIL 
The need for a more quantitative approach to risk mitigation dates 
back over 20 years. The background leading to such practices is 
supported in this first section which details previous incidents, 
process safety codes and standards, and a review of qualitative 
deficiencies.  
Historical Incidents and Incentives for Change 
Most are familiar with the large catastrophic incidents that 
stimulated the process safety changes. Namely, who could forget? 
 Flixborough, England
 Bhopal, India
 Piper Alpha
 Philips, Pasadena
In each of these cases, risk was not recognized and catastrophic 
results occurred due to changes made without a full review of 
engineered protective systems. 
But are you aware of the magnitude of rotating equipment failure 
for similar issues? In 2009, Mr. Edward Clark published Steam 
Turbine Overspeed Incidents and it combined listings from three 
respected consultants [R2]. Below is a table summarizing the 
number of serious consequences from the 110 turbine overspeed 
cases presented in the study. 
Consequence Period No. %/Period 
Major $$ Cost During Ops 30 27% 
Fatality 
During Ops 3 4% 
During Testing 3 12% 
Major Incidents/ Total 36/110 33% 
Table 1: Summary of Steam Turbine Overspeed Incidents 
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 Also, Mr. Clark prepared a list titled Recent Rotating Equipment 
Failures at Five Refineries [R3] and it contains similar history as 
shown in Table 2 below. 
Equipment     Site Event 
Unit Charge Pump A Major Fire 
Pump A A Vapor Cloud Release 
Pump B A Vapor Cloud Release 
Unit Screw Compressor A Major Fire 
Pump A Major Fire 
Pump B Major Fire 
Coker Wet Gas 
Compressor 
C Vapor Cloud Release 
XX Crude Pump C Major Fire 
FCC Auxiliary Air Blower D Fire 
FCC Unit Main Air Blower E Near Miss 
Table 2: Recent Rotating Equip Failures Five Refineries 
Summary 
Such events support a change to a more thorough approach to risk 
analysis, interlock design, and operational measures so that such 
incidents are minimized as low as reasonably practicable.  
Standards Timeline 
New process plant design and existing facilities have included risk 
assessments associated with their unique processes for many years, 
although it was not until the release of 29 CFR 1910.119, Process 
Safety Management (PSM) for Highly Hazardous Chemicals [R4] 
that it became a formal requirement in the U.S. (Note that some 
equivalent requirements are usually present in other parts of the 
world, but not always.)  
After OSHA 1910.119, there was a succession of domestic and 
international attempts at standards for interlock design. They 
included: 
a. AIChE CCPS, Guidelines for Safe Automation of 
Chemical Processes, 1993 
b. ISA S84.01-1996, App. of Safety Inst. Sys. for the 
Process Ind., Feb. 15, 1996 
c. ANSI approval of S84, 1997 
d. IEC 61508, Functional Safety: Safety-Related Systems 
"General" released, 1998 
e. OSHA recommends S84, Mar 23, 2000 
f. IEC 61511, Functional Safety: Safety Inst. Systems for 
the Process Ind., 2002 
g. ISA S84.00.01-2004, Sept 2, 2004 (ISA84) 
The focus of this paper is on implementation of ISA84 [R5] to 
rotating equipment. Its full implementation involves a Safety Life 
Cycle (SLC) as most have experienced with engineered systems 
and will be highlighted in the following section.   
Specific to turbomachinery, the 5th edition of the API Machinery 
Protection Standard API670 provides detailed guidelines on the 
implementation of the machinery protection systems (MPSs). It 
will be reviewed in more detail shortly. 
Qualitative versus Quantitative Techniques for Risk Mitigation 
Process Hazard Assessment (PHA) is a systematic way to identify 
all potential hazards for a facility so the risk team can determine 
how to manage each one. Generally speaking, HAZOPs are 
favored for their thoroughness with processes, since the whole 
plant is reviewed node-by-node, with a detailed set of guide words 
applied to each characteristic of the process. What-ifs, FMEAs, and 
Checklists are used for many rotating equipment configurations.  
The primary objective of the PHA studies was to identify the 
causes of potential safety and environmental hazards, as well as 
major operability problems. Based on the evaluated consequences 
and safeguards identified, the multi-disciplined PHA team 
proposed recommendations to reduce the risk and enhance 
operability to tolerable levels in compliance with each company’s 
risk criteria.  
Use of qualitative risk ranking tools is relatively simple, but lead to 
inconsistencies between different PHA teams as well as the 
potential to under or over-estimate the risk. For lower level risks, 
this is not generally a significant concern, however, for higher risks 
there is a need for management to be able to make better informed 
decisions using a more consistent basis. That requires a greater 
level of insight and is provided by more quantitative analysis 
techniques that determine if there is a risk or Safety Integrity Level 
(SIL) gap.  In layman terms, SIL refers to “orders of risk 
reduction” as shown in the following table: 
SIL Risk Reduction 
1 > 10 factor 
2 >  100 factor 
3 > 1,000 factor 
Table 3: SIL & Risk Reduction 
After such risk targets are discovered, other Safety Life Cycle 
(SLC) processes are followed such as verification calculations of 
the formally termed Safety Instrumented Functions (SIFs). This 
and other such processes ensure that the SIFs are capable of 
achieving the necessary risk reduction. 
PHA Example – Reciprocating Compressor 
The following table provides a glimpse of the main components for 
a reciprocating compressor PHA.  
Deviation Cause Consequence
Safe-
guards
S L R Recommendation
Too High 
level
Level  dump 
fa i ls  closed
Water entra inment 
leading to damage & 
loss  of containment
High 
level  
a larm
2 4 3
1. Cons ider adding 
high level  trip i f 
required by LOPA
Maint. va lve 
inadvertently 
left closed
Water entra inment 
leading to damage & 
loss  of containment
High 
level  
a larm
2 5 4
(repeat 1. Add high 
level  trip)
 
Table 4: PHA Example – Reciprocating Compressor 
This PHA data will serve as input to the subsequent SIL analysis to 
further quantify that risk reduction was obtained. 
FUNDAMENTALS ON SIL REQUIREMENTS 
Once an interlock has received the “SIL branding”, the ISA84 
standard requires that other steps be followed diligently to ensure 
that both random and systematic failure is not introduced into its 
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design and operability. The highlights of this process are captured 
in the remainder of this section. 
Functional Safety Management (FSM)  
The first ISA 84 objective is to specify safety lifecycle (SLC) 
management and technical activities needed to implement the 
safety instrumented system. It should designate responsibilities for 
each SLC phase and the activities within that phase.  
The basic FSM tasks include: 
1. Defining a safety lifecycle process. 
2. Developing a functional safety management procedure.  
3. Develop a project execution safety plan.  
Functional safety management (FSM) is specifically noted to act as 
an extension to existing monitored quality systems and processes. 
This quality-based philosophy of “plan, execute according to plan, 
verify, document, and improve based on the resulting experience” 
carries through the entire safety lifecycle. 
Alternative SIL Determination Methods 
There are various graphical and numerical techniques to determine 
the required SIL value to achieve a target risk goal. Those cited in 
ISA84 follow in Table 2.  
Annex Name Origin 
A 
ALARP* (As Low as Reasonably 
Practicable) 
UK ** 
B Semi-Quantitative USA 
C Safety Layer Matrix USA 
D 
Calibrated Risk Graph: Semi-
Qualitative 
UK + Finland 
E Risk Graph: Qualitative Germany 
F 
Layer of Protection Analysis 
(LOPA) 
USA 
Table 5: Comparison of different SIL Selection Methods 
Each of these methods should give roughly the same answer if 
they're "calibrated" to the same tolerable risk. The real choice in 
technique depends more on what fits best with a company’s 
existing risk management philosophy and procedures. For each 
hazard, the SIL technique must take into account: 
1. The corporations' tolerable limits 
2. Full and mitigated consequences of each hazard 
3. Root cause or initiating event frequency 
4. Number and effectiveness of independent safeguards 
If there's a gap between the tolerable and current hazard frequency 
(taking into account the applicable safeguards, but not the SIF), 
then added protection is required. It can be either a SIF or other 
layers of protection. 
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) 
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is one of the more popular 
SIL methods utilized. LOPA has been described as a semi-
quantitative method of risk analysis and is a new and progressive 
approach to risk reduction for the process industries.  The key 
elements that differentiate it from other qualitative SIL selection 
formats are: 
• Quantification of the risk accounting for initiating cause 
frequency and independent layers of protection (IPL), 
where IPLs prevent the propagation and fulfillment of a 
hazardous event. 
• Application of conditional modifiers (probabilities) that 
affect the likelihood of the hazardous event being enabled 
or mitigation and thus alters the hazardous event outcome. 
The LOPA methodology helps us predict with greater certainty and 
consistency whether or not the risk complies with corporate 
criteria. 
Data used in the LOPAs and their references are normally 
documented in each company’s guidance document.  
LOPA Worksheet Example  
Without going into the intricate details of the LOPA process, the 
following worksheet (Figure 1) shows how these key elements are 
utilized together. 
 
Figure 1: Typical Turbomachinery LOPA Worksheet 
If the LOPA study found that there was a deficiency in risk 
reduction, the site would need to look at either eliminating or 
lowering the frequency of initiating causes, adding independent 
protection layers, or verifying that their current or proposed safety 
instrument shutdown function met the level of risk reduction set by 
the corporate policy. The latter case is called SIL verification and 
is based on instrumentation make-up and testing frequency. If the 
calculation proved that the required risk reduction was met, no 
further action would be required.  
Safety Requirement Specification (SRS) 
The safety requirements specification (SRS) is the primary 
reference for the remaining parts of the safety lifecycle. This 
document is especially important since it often marks the handoff 
of safety lifecycle responsibility from one company to another and 
is a key project communication document. Once these 
requirements are clearly laid out, they will significantly help the 
remaining design, installation, and operation phases of the safety 
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systems lifecycle. The SRS addresses both functional and integrity 
specifications as stated below. 
The functional part of the SRS describes what the safety 
instrumented function does when harm from a given hazard is 
imminent. Required details include process inputs and their trip 
set-points, safety system outputs and their actions, and the logical 
relationship between each of them. This is a similar requirement 
for any control loop within the basic process control system, but in 
the SRS case, improved safety, not production, is the goal. Some of 
the specified functional requirements that have been included in 
ISA84 are included in Table 6.  
ISA84 SRS Functional Requirements  
Defined safe state 
SIS process measurements and their trip points 
SIS process output actions 
The functional relationship between inputs / outputs 
Manual shutdown detail 
Energize or de-energize to trip specification 
Action(s) to be taken on loss of energy source(s) to SIS 
Method to reset the SIS after a shutdown 
Table 6: ISA84 SRS Functional Requirements 
The integrity part of the SRS describes “how well” the safety 
instrumented function needs to work when harm from a given 
hazard is imminent. In this part of the SRS, it must specify such 
things as the required SIL, as well as necessary diagnostics, 
maintenance, and testing. Some of the specified integrity 
requirements that have been included in ISA84 are included in 
Table 7.  
ISA84 SRS Integrity Requirements 
Proof test intervals 
Response time for the SIS to bring process to safe state 
SIL & operational demand mode (demand or continuous) 
Maximum allowable spurious trip rate 
Failure modes & desired response of the SIS (alarms, auto 
s/d) 
All interfaces between the SIS and any other system 
(BPCS, ops) 
The extremes of all SIS environmental conditions 
Requirements for diagnostics to achieve the required SIL 
Table 7: ISA84 SRS Integrity Requirements 
Verification Calculations 
Each safety instrumented function (SIF) design must now be 
verified through probabilistic calculations. (See ISA84 Clause 
11.9.1) The key here is to do the probabilistic calculations for each 
SIF which will verify safety and spurious trip performance criteria 
as well as optimize design to economically meet the requirements 
for each different function. The spurious trip discovery could be 
quite significant for plant production where it has been stated that 
up to 18% of plant trips are associated with instrumentation. 
Verification calculations are performed after the other conceptual 
design steps have been completed at draft level. See Safety 
Instrumented Systems Verification -Practical Probabilistic 
Calculations [R6] for more information on this subject.  
If calculations show that the draft design does not meet the SIL 
target, the choices are: 
1. Shorten the testing interval, but not beyond the practical 
point for operations 
2. Select better technology/equipment. 
3. Add redundancy or other IPLs  
The conceptual design iterations will continue until the SIL or risk 
reduction target is met with the overall most economical system. 
SIL Verification Calculations Example 
Although the SIL verification calculations can be completed by 
hand with the ISA84 simplified equations and Markov models, 
most functional safety professionals prefer to use off-the-shelf 
tools. Shown below is the output of such software.  
 
Figure 3: SIL Verification Analysis Output  
Maintenance and Testing  
Since OSHA 1910.119 Process Safety Management covered many 
of the operations and maintenance requirements, most companies 
are performing some level of tests. For many, it is a full functional 
test from the sensor to the final device done a periodic basis that 
aligns with their scheduled shutdowns.  
While this is still considered good practice, there may be benefits 
employed by utilizing upgraded diagnostic methods that are less 
invasive on the process. Given the capabilities of safety certified 
instrumentation, many of the functional proof test methods 
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developed for relays and pneumatic instruments is not only less 
effective, but very costly compared to more appropriate methods. 
The biggest issue with proof testing is that no methods have 100% 
coverage of dangerous failures. To account for this discrepancy, 
replacement or “rebuild to new” (i.e. mission times) now must be 
specified for all equipment and they must be within the useful life 
of the component. 
The second issue discovered when reviewing site test practices is 
that most procedures included the full functional test, but testing of 
the diagnostic routines was not completed. Since the associated 
SIFs verification included such diagnostics, such test practices had 
to be upgraded to account for detection of faults, degraded 
architecture, and presentation of associated alarms. 
 Example – Optimized Turbine Testing and Maintenance 
As discussed in above, no proof tests are 100% effective in 
detecting all covert faults. Due to such a limitation, 
turbomachinery specialists in one corporation inherently 
understood this issue and have been rebuilding their critical trip 
and throttle valves in every turnaround for years. This level of 
maintenance, coupled with optimized partial stroke testing 
techniques, has helped each site meet their SIL2 safety and 
production goals simultaneously. 
SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS OF SIL WITHIN API670 
Although API Machinery Protection Standard API670 has been 
around since the 1980s, the November 2014 update adds over 150 
pages of new content. The most notable changes are shown in the 
following table: 
Clause 
/Annex 
Specification 
8 Electronic Overspeed -More detailed discussion 
9 Surge detection (New) 
10  ESD (New) 
K Surge Detection (New) 
L Safety Integrity Level (New) 
M Spurious Shutdowns (New) 
N Condition Monitoring (New) 
O Overspeed (New) 
P Recip Compressors (New) 
Q Wireless (New) 
Table 8: New Clauses & Annexes in API670 
Such additions support a cohesive strategy with the other process 
and machine functional safety standards. 
Emergency Shutdown Device (ESD) and API670 
The Emergency Shutdown Device (ESD) detailed in clause 10 is 
synonymous to the SIS detailed by ISA84. By having such a 
“single brain” for supporting all the critical safety functions, the 
first requirement of consolidating all trip demands and ensuring 
“proper timing and sequencing for a safe shutdown” is met.  
There is latitude on whether all the shutdown logic is performed in 
the ESD. If it is not and separate surge, monitoring, and overspeed 
systems are tied into the ESD, the overall system is considered to 
have “distributed architecture”. If such functions are included in 
the ESD, then it is termed “Integrated Architecture”.  
Annex L – Safety Integrity Level  
Annex L provides a 17-page introduction of the SIL concepts and 
correlates their application to turbomachinery standards. Although 
the risk graph methodology is not as prevalent in the USA as it is 
in Europe, its principals still apply to those that have standardized 
on LOPA as mentioned earlier.  
Key takeaways from this SIL annex include: 
 SIL compliance, although associated directly to the ESD 
logic solver, should be extended to the I/O devices 
 Separation of control and safety is imperative 
 SIL is determined by performance requirements set by 
each user, not by prescriptive methods 
Such practices line up closely with those of the currently functional 
standards like ISA84. 
Annex M – Spurious Shutdowns 
Since safe, fault tolerant methods with higher spurious trip rates 
may at times oppose process uptime (i.e. machine reliability), this 
annex “recommends some practice to reduce the risk of economic 
losses”. 
Key takeaways from this spurious trip annex include: 
 Utilization of fault tolerant designs for safety and 
reliability 
 Applying preventative diagnostics where applicable 
Regarding plant impact examples, the following table truly 
supports such measures. 
Process Application Spurious Trip Cost 
Oil & Gas Platforms Up to $2 million/day 
Polystrene 
20 days to recover at 
$20k/day=$400k 
Refinery Coker Heater $35k/day 
Refinery Catalytic 
Cracker 
$500k 
Complete Refinery $1 million/day 
Ammonia & Urea Plants $1 million/day 
Power Generation $100k/MW hour to $millions/site 
Ethylene 
$1 million to include getting 
product to spec 
Table 9: Spurious Trip Cost in Different Process Industries 
[R7] 
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COMMON SIL RATINGS FOR ROTATING EQUIPMENT  
As shown in the preceding section, the process of SIL assignment 
takes into account the end user’s risk target, consequence severity, 
initiating cause frequency, the number of safeguards, and the 
application of conditional modifiers, so the final SIL requirement 
can vary widely. Utilizing the experience of the authors and a 
broad perspective of reviews, the following table offers a glimpse 
of what could be expected.  
  
SIL Target 
Driver Application High Low Norm 
Steam turbine  Overspeed SIL2 SIL1 SIL1 
Centrifugal 
Compressor 
Anti-Surge SIL2 None SIL1 
High Level SIL2 None SIL1 
Gas turbine  Light Off SIL2 SIL1 SIL1 
Turbine Generator Overspeed SIL2 SIL2 SIL2 
Reciprocating 
Compressor 
High Level SIL2 None SIL1 
HP discharge SIL2 None SIL1 
Table 10: Common SIL Targets for Rotating Equipment 
Naturally, each company must review each application individually 
to avoid either over- specification, or more imperative for safety, 
under-specification of turbomachinery SIL. 
ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION OF SIL 
Based on the previous publication on turbomachinery failures at 
refineries [R3] and a general review of their applications, the 
following table summarizes where the SIL principles could be 
applied. 
Equipment     Event 
SIL 
Case? 
Issue 
Charge 
Pump 
Major Fire Yes Failure of lube oil 
trip 
Pump A Vapor Cloud  Yes Seal pressure trip 
 Pump B Vapor Cloud 
Release 
Yes Seal pressure 
interlock 
Unit Screw 
Comp 
Major Fire Yes Failure of lube oil 
trip 
Pump Major Fire Mech  Vibration? 
Pump Major Fire Yes Vibration trip 
Coker Wet 
Gas Comp 
Vapor Cloud 
Release 
Yes Vibration trip 
Crude 
Pump 
Major Fire Mech 
issue 
Vibration? 
FCC Aux 
Air Blower 
Fire Yes Surge detection 
FCC  Main 
Air Blower 
Near Miss Yes Integrity issue of 
interlock 
Table 11: Recent Rotating Equip Failures Five Refineries 
Summary of SIL Issues 
Of those, the majority may have been prevented following better 
SIL functional safety management.  
 In addition to the incidents listed above, the same could be said for 
the 110 steam turbine overspeed incidents [R2]. The following 
table summarizes primary failure modes for the interlocks in those 
cases. 
Interlock Failure Classification Cases % 
Random Hardware Failure 22 20.0% 
Systematic 
Failure 
Analysis 9 8.2% 
Design 15 13.6% 
Commissioning 2 1.8% 
Operational 10 9.1% 
Testing 25 22.7% 
Failure cause not stated 27 24.5% 
Cases total 110 100% 
Table 12: Summary of Steam Turbine Overspeed Failures 
As can be shown, systematic failures account for over 50% of the 
overspeed cases. More detailed procedures, verification, and 3rd 
party assessments should minimize such accidents. 
SIL Economics – Justification for Investment 
The 36 serious accidents that resulted from turbine overspeed 
errors can be broken down into two general categories, namely: 
 Functional Specification 
These are the actions needed to prevent the incident that are laid 
out by the safety controls engineer in the form of detailed 
requirements, such as input & outputs and their relationships, 
response time, trip points, etc.  In an HSE study [R8], two 
examples (reactor and material handling) presented had incorrect 
safe state action after the hazard was detected. 
 Integrity Specification 
This involves the "failure free" operation of the safety system. The 
failures could be either random (component failures) or systematic 
(based on procedures. Two random failure examples include circuit 
board and motor contactor failures. 
As an economics example based on a functional specification error, 
consider the following catastrophic event scenario. You have the 
potential for a large loss of $10 Million based upon an in initiating 
event that could occur every ten years. If your corporate tolerable 
frequency limit for an event of this magnitude is once in ten 
thousand years, then you are accepting the following risk targets: 
 Tolerable Cost/yr = $10 million/10,000  years = $1,000/yr  
  Chance of Plant Accident in 50 years= 50 yr * 
(accident/10,000 years) * 100= 0.5% 
 To lower the frequency to this tolerable level, a combination of 
safeguards will need to be in place which prevent the initiating 
event from causing the accident at least 999 out of 1,000 times. 
Naturally, the more independent non-SIS safeguards that you have 
in place, the lower the safety system's SIL rating needs to be. This 
is shown below in the two left hand columns. The table also shows 
the escalating cost associated with making a specification error 
such that the SIS does not prevent the accident even when it works 
according to design. 
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Table 13: Exposure with Loss of SIS Protection 
As the table dramatically shows, it is increasingly important to get 
the functional specification correct when working with higher SIL 
values. This is why the ISA 84-2004 safety lifecycle design stages 
and the methods to reduce systematic errors are based upon each 
safety function’s SIL value. The higher the SIL, the more strenuous 
your safety lifecycle reviews and cross checks must be to ensure 
that systematic errors are kept in check. 
 As we noted, the safety lifecycle deals with both random and 
systematic causes of accidents. The random part is addressed and 
managed with the part of SIL related to probability of failure upon 
demand averaged (PFDavg) and risk reduction factor. But since it 
represents only part of the safety system specification and only part 
of the sources for dangerous errors, more is needed. Other 
systematic problems, such as failing to consider alternate paths to 
the accident or not fully specifying all of the elements of the safety 
function can kill people just as dead. Thus, the functional safety 
management parts of the safety lifecycle that address these 
systematic errors are vitally needed to provide the required risk 
reduction. 
EXAMPLE: THE COMPLETE SIL PROCESS APPLIED TO 
A HIGH HORSEPOWER TURBINE 
These unique SIL processes were recently utilized on a critical 
high horsepower turbine application and will be generally 
discussed so that the overall safety lifecycle can be understood.  
1. Utilizing a HAZOP to Identify a High Severity Hazard 
Per OHSA 1910.119 regulatory requirements for review of process 
hazards every 5 years, a HAZOP was conducted and the team 
concluded that a loss of load based on a coupling failure would 
result in turbine overspeed. Such an event was considered 
significant and had severe personnel injury and mechanical impacts 
2. Applying a LOPA Review to Quantify Risk 
Since the user wanted to follow Recognized and Generally 
Accepted Good Engineering Practice (RAGAGEP) for risk 
mitigation, LOPA practices were adapted to further quantify risk 
exposure. The turbine overspeed scenario met the criteria for 
further detailed analysis through LOPA due to its severe safety 
consequences.   
Based on the cause, consequence severities, and safe guards stated 
in the HAZOP, the following LOPA worksheet was completed by 
a competent team during a LOPA workshop. 
 
Figure 3: LOPA Tool Output for High HP Turbine  
After reviewing the current safeguards and determining that none 
besides the overspeed trip were effective to prevent the hazard, the 
LOPA output specified a SIL2 requirement for the trip system. 
3. Defining SIL Requirements in the SRS 
Since the overspeed interlock was now SIL2 classified, 
documentation was developed to specify its performance 
requirements. In all, there were twenty-seven requirements 
documented to meet the ISA84 functional safety standard.  
The most stringent SRS requirement was the process safety time of 
only 50 milli-seconds due to such a quick load release on a turbine 
of such horsepower. Like all the SRS requirements, such an 
accelerated response would need to be validated during the pre-
startup safety review and all proof tests in the future. 
4. Performing SIL Verification to Prove that SIL2 was 
Attained 
To prove that the overspeed trip met the SIL2 risk target, reliability 
calculations were performed as the next step in the functional 
safety lifecycle.  Such calculations were based on the components 
selected, their voting architecture, diagnostics applied, and finally, 
testing and replacement intervals.  
The specific components that made up the overspeed trip system 
included the magnetic pickup sensors, logic solver (i.e. Safety PLC 
or SIS), the trip & throttle shutoff valve, and any interface 
components in between. There initially was no concern in meeting 
the SIL2 target since the overspeed system applied SIL3 certified 
electronics and the final element was partial stroke tested.  
Data for the certified devices was readily available in the vender’s 
product safety manuals.  It should be noted that the two (2) 
commonly accepted functional safety assessment agencies include 
Non -
SIS 
IPLs* 
SIS 
Ratin
g 
With Loss of SIS 
Increase in 
Cost Over 
Tolerable Cost 
Chance of 
Accident 
in Lifetime 
2 SIL1  $10,000/yr  5% $9,000/yr 
1 SIL2  $100,000/yr  50% $99,000/yr 
0 SIL3   $1,000,000/yr  Near 100% $999,000/yr 
* Non-SIS IPLs (i.e. Basic Process Control System, operator 
intervention, pressure relief valves, and deluge systems) are 
typical non-SIS safeguards for many companies. Each 
safeguard is assumed to have a Risk Reduction Factor (RRF) of 
10. 
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TUV and exida Certification and the standard adhered to is 
IEC61508 [R9]. 
Since the trip & throttle valve had not been certified and the 
manufacturer had no failure mode specific data, the SIS project 
engineer contracted a Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostics 
Analysis (FMEDA). This analysis was specific to the OEM’s valve 
assembly and therefore resulted in a precise, yet conservative data 
set to be used in the SIL verification calculations.. Otherwise, 
conservative data based on generic components would have been 
used and the SIL2 risk target likely would not have been met. 
Another SIL2 issue surfaced when an emergency trip device (ETD) 
was discovered in the turbine mechanical drawings. The ETD was 
critical to the overspeed trip since it acted as an interface 
component for dumping the hydraulic power fluid. Since it could 
not be tested by the partial stoke apparatus, it became a SIL2 
limiter and the overspeed system became degraded to SIL1. 
Fortunately, the design team found an alternative solution to avoid 
adding an inline steam valve (~ $300k). 
The team utilized a commercially available software platform to 
perform the calculations. SIL2 results were achieved by using 
partial stroke testing and accounting for specific overspeed failure 
modes where a significant leak was required to fit the scenario 
stated. The results are shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: SIL Verification Tool Output for High HP Turbine  
With the upgraded model, this overspeed trip met SIL2 and had a 
7.15 year spurious trip rate.  
5. Periodic Maintenance & Testing 
Once operational, periodic procedures were to be developed and 
performed as per the SIL verification and manufacturers 
requirements. Any component failures will be documented and 
also compared to data utilized in the original study to ensure that 
the risk target is continually achieved. 
By applying and documenting each of these ISA84 safety lifecycle 
steps, the user felt assured that they had met current RAGAGEP 
and underwriter requirements. 
 
CONCLUSION 
SIL is here to stay; get on-board 
Taken individually, each of the guidance measures presented in the 
earlier chapters should make “good engineering sense”. But 
dependent upon where each company is in their functional safety 
lifecycle development, the sum of the measures may be 
overwhelming. The key takeaway is this – each progressive step 
forward makes our industry a safer one. 
Applied properly, SIL knowledge will be an advantage 
Although the task of ISA84 compliance can seem daunting, it is 
worth the effort. With a growing public risk aversion, the process 
industry cannot be satisfied with an “it’s never happened here 
before” safety culture.   
Each progressive measure taken in ISA84 compliance is fully 
worth the investment. Although most responsible facilities want to 
get there immediately, a 6 to 10 year full implementation is 
expected. The key takeaway is this – each step forward makes our 
industry a safer one. 
ABBREVIATIONS 
API – American Petroleum Institute 
ESD – Emergency Shutdown Device 
ISA – International Systems and Automation 
FSM – Functional Safety Management 
LOPA – Layer of Protection Analysis  
SLC – Safety Lifecycle 
SIF – Safety Instrumented Function 
SIL – Safety Integrity Level 
SRS – Safety Requirements Specification 
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